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Mr Younger defended the use of his new statutory 
powers to penalise authorities whose spending was 
considered 'excessive and unreasonable'. He said: 
'somebody had to do something to protect ratepayers 
from a totally intolerable burden'. The Government 
had inherited a 'totally unrealistic• public expen-
diture programme and were now trying to 'get the 
runaway train under control'. 
The Scotsman, 16th June 1981 
Many political issues ultimately boil doM1 to disputes about 
the raising and use of 'public money'. The whole question of gov-
ernment policy towards local authorities falls clearly into this 
category. The Conservative Government was elected on a platform of 
rolling back the public sector and that inevitably meant fewer re-
fer local authorities. But the issue which has subsequently 
is that any sharp withdrawal of central goverlli~ent re-
sources 
emerged 
sources from local authorities has clear constitutional implica-
tions. 
British local authorities are more dependent on central gov-
ernment for their resources than is customarily the case in other 
European countries(l)_ Consequently, they are extremely vulnerable 
in the race of reductions in grant levels. In Scotland, the Conser-
vative Government's policy of cutting both the Rate Support Grant 
(RSG) and the Housing Support Grant (HSG) has had a sharp impact 
upon the finances of local authorities. In most cases even large 
rates increases are unlikely to prevent reductions in services. 
But at the same time the Secretary of State for Scotland is clearly 
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frustrated at his inability to control local authorities. Just as 
local authorities believe that such withdrawals of central resources 
roean that they are no longer able to carry out the job for which 
theY were elected, the Secretary of State believes that local autho-
rities are undermining the economic strategy of the Goverlli~ent. 
That economic strategy involves a smaller public sector for 
reasons which are both ideological and budgetary. The Conservative 
Goverlli~ent has made clear its ideological commitment to reverse the 
growth of the public sector. The budgetary problem is more compli-
cated and is discussed later. The scene is being set for intensify-
ing conflict whereas traditionally relationships between Scottish 
local authorities ~~d the Scottish Office have been fairly amicable. 
Much more identity of interest (i.e. protecting Scotland) has so 
far existed than between English local authorities and the Depart-
ment of Environ~ent. 
The objective of this chapter is to set these conflicts over 
public money into their proper context. One of the characteristic 
features of debates in the UK about financial issues is the very 
low level of public understanding. Although the fine detail of me-
chanisms like RSG is fascinating to a limited number of practition-
ers and academics, the almost uniform response of the wider circle 
of politicians, administrators and the public is one of bewilder-
ment at the mysteries involved. Wnat we seek to do is to enable 
this wider circle to understand why the conflict between Scottish 
local authorities and the Secretary of State came to a head in 
the summer of 1981. 
Inevitably, these specific events will continue to unfold 
after this chapter is completed in July 1981. Our purpose is, how-
ever, to explore the underlying pressures, which will continue to 
exert influence beyond this immediate conflict. 
Given that the Conservative Government was elected in the 
aftermath of the devolution referendum of 1979, there were then 
considerable fears that it might reverse the process of administra-
tive devolution which had been under way in Scotland over the pre-
vious 90 years. Although little is documented about the internal 
debates within the present Government, the result has been that 
certain of the financial changes which were originally intended to 
accompany devolution have nevertheless been continued or implemented. 
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Exa~ples include the use of the Barnett formula(Z) to allocate 
changes in comparable expenditure between Scotland, England and 
Wales and the formalisation of the Secretary of State's ability to 
switch expenditure between the different progr~~es within his own 
expenditure block. 
Although Scotland has had to take its 'share' of cuts in pub-
lic expenditure, the capacity of Scottish decision-makers to arti-
culate Scottish priorities is greater than ever before. The Sec-
retary of State now decides the balance of expenditure cuts be-
tween his different progranmes. This means that he is deciding the 
balance of expenditure cuts between progr~~es on which spending is 
incurred by local authorities and by public corporations as well 
as by the Scottish Office itself. Table 1 summarises the public 
expenditure context of grants for Scottish local authorities. It 
distinguishes five distinct stages linking the Cabinet's decision 
on overall public spending to the operation of the Secretary of 
State's financial controls over local authorities. 
Recent developments in Scotland have followed a rather diff-
erent course from those in England and Wales. The Secretary of 
State decided not to extend to Scotland the new form of RSG intro-
duced for England and Wales by the Local Government, Planning and 
Land Act 1980(
3
). This new 'block grant' form of RSG was suggested 
in 1974 by the Department of Environment in its evidence to the 
Layfield Committee(
4 l. Although rejected by the Labour Government, 
following an adverse response from local authorities, it was sub-
sequently adopted by the Conservative Government as a way of red-
ucin9 local government expenditure in line with its expenditure 
plans. During the passage of this Act, the Scottish Office made no 
move to introduce legislation. The fact that the block grant was 
not extended to Scotland was at that time regaYded as an exa~ple of 
the Scottish Office mediatin;J the impact of UK policies upon 
Scotland. 
Scottish Office ministers then came under mounting pressure to 
produce their own proposals to deal with errant Scottish authori-
ties, notably Lothian Regional Council. In response, they eventually 
produced their own Bill - now enacted as the Local Government (Misc-
ellaneous Provisions)(Scotland) Act 1981( 5 ). Despite the earlier 
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The Cabinet takes its annual decisions on the planned level of 
public expenditure for the four years (previously five) of the 
Public Expenditure Survey (PESC). This process surfaces with 
the publication of the annual public expenditure White Paper. 
Decisions are taken on the aggregate levels of: 
(a) comparable expenditure: 
(b) non-comparable expenditure: 
This covers the vast majority 
of the expenditure within the 
control of the Secretaries of 
State for Scotland and Wales 
(93% for both Scotland and 
Wales in 1981-82), together 
with the equivalent 
expenditure in England. 
This covers the rest of 
public expenditure (e.g. the 
big UK programmes such.as 
defence and social security). 
Any cuts in the GB total of comparable expenditure are 
allocated on the Barnett formula: 
10% of the reduction off Scottish 
5% of the reduction off Welsh 




The Secretary of State exercises complete discretion about the 
composition of spending cuts within his expenditure block 
(i.e. Scottish comparable expenditure). His only control over 
the total reduction in this block is through his role as a 
Cabinet minister (i.e. when total public expenditure and the 
balance between comparable and non-comparable programmes is 
decided). However, he is solely responsible for the pattern 
of spending cuts set out in the White Paper. 
As local authorities spend just over half of the expenditure 
within his programmes, the Secretary of State will use his 
financial instruments (e.g. grants such as RSG and HSG; and 
capital allocations) to secure reductions in local authority 
expenditure in line with the White Paper plans. 
Based on Heald, D.A., Territorial Equity and Public Finances: 
Concepts and Confusion, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 
University of Strathclyde, 1980. 
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reluctance to take new legislative powers, the Secretary o£ State 
has taken upon himself £ar more ministerial discretion over the 
a££airs o£ individual local authorities than his English and Welsh 
counterparts enjoy. The block grant at least establishes a set o£ 
rules which govern a local authority's grant entitlement and which 
are known before the local authority makes its budgetary decisions~)
There are no such rules in Scotland. Grant withdrawal under the 
Scottish Act will be based upon criteria set at the discretion o£ 
the Secretary o£ State, after local authority budgets have been 
completed. 
Having reviewed the political and budgetary background, we 
will now explain the structure o£ this chapter. Section I outlines 
the existing system o£ grants to local authorities; Section II 
ex&~ines the objectives which the Government's expenditure and 
grants policy is intended to achieve; Section Ill analyses the 
policy instruments which the Secretary o£ State has at his disposal 
when he attempts to influence local budgetary decisions; Section 
IV ex~~ines the use o£ the powers o£ selective grant withdrawal 
under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) 
Act; and Section V assesses the significance o£ these contemporary 
events £or the government o£ Scotland. 
I The Structure o£ Governmen! Grants 
Scottish local authorities are financed £rom a number o£ re-
venue sources. They have only one tax - the local rates. Charges 
£or services which local authorities provide, such as rents £or 
council housing, £ares £or municipal buses, and fees £or using 
facilities such as gol£ courses are a second source o£ income. Gov-
ernment grants are a third. The most important o£ these is the 
Rate Support Grant which is calculated as a percentage o£ what is 
termed 'relevant expenditure 1 ( 7 ). Table 2 summarises the latest 
available information. In 1978-79, grants financed 51.5% o£ re-
venue expenditure whereas rates financed 24.6%. The balance is 
accounted £or by charges, sales and other items such as rents and 
interest receipts. Grants account £or a much smaller proportion o£ 
total income (roughly, one hal£) than is suggested by the RSG per-
centage (roughly, two thirds). This is mainly a result o£ relevant 
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defined net of receipts from charges and excluding certain items of 
expenditure. Our simplified account of the Scottish grants system 
abstracts from a number of complexities which are not fundamental 
to the main issues( 8 ). 
Until recently there have been two RSG systems, one for Eng-
land and Wales and one for Scotland. An important extension of ad-
ministrative devolution has been the establishment in 1981-82 of a 
separate Welsh RSG. Until the separate introduction of the block 
grant in England and Wales, the structure of RSG was common to both 
systems( 9 ). 
The Scottish RSG still has three elements: 
1. Needs element is designed to offset differences in 1 need 1 
between local authorities, as well as making a general exchequer 
contribution on a per capita basis towards the cost of local gov-
ernment services. The 'need' for local government services may vary 
between areas. The type of factors which have been built into needs 
element are population, number of school children, number of old age 
pensioners, population sparsity and population decline. A figure is 
calculated for 'weighted population' which is intended to reflect 
more closely the 'need' of a particular local authority area for ser-
vices than population itself would do. Although this procedure is 
justifiable on a conceptual basis, it has proved immensely diffi-
cult to produce justifiable measures of 'need'. The procedure in 
England and Wales was to use step-wise multiple regression analysis: 
although superficially 'objective', its use has been severely criti-
cised(lO)_ In Scotland the distribution of needs element has always 
been much more judgemental, reflecting the assessments of success-
ive Secretaries of State of what is a desirable pattern of grant 
distribution(ll)_ 
2. Resources element is designed to eliminate the effect of 
differences in the level of per capita rateable value. Without such 
a grant, those local authorities with high per capita rateable 
values would be able to finance a given level of per capita expen-
diture much more cheaply than those with a low level. Focus is being 
placed upon the resources available to a local authority rather 
th~~ upon the resources of the residents of that area. A 'rich' 
local authority may not be composed •:>f 1 rich 1 inhabitants because 
non-domestic rateable value accounts for 63 per cent of rateable 
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value in Scotland as a whole, and there are substantial variations 
between authorities in this percentage. A local authority with pre-
dominantly low income households but high industrial and commercial 
rateable value may be a 1 rich 1 authority whereas an authority with 
very high-valued domestic property but little industrial and comm-
ercial rateable value may be a 'poor' authority. The basic princi-
ple of resources element is to compensate local authorities which 
ha'/e low per capita rateable values by paying grant so as to put 
them in the s~11e position as if each had at least a prescribed le'Jel 
of per capita rateable value. Local authorities either have the phy-
sical rateable value or they are credited with notional rateable 
value. The Secretary of State 'pays rates' on this notional rate-
able value at the poundage which the local authority itself declares. 
Therefore for any local authority in receipt of resources element 
it will attract more grant the higher the rate poundage it sets. 
This has been much criticised but, given the objective above, such 
a characteristic is an inevitable and indeed desirable feature of 
the grant system. Nevertheless this criticism of resources element 
is an important factor behind this Government's changes to the 
grants system in all parts of Great Britain. 
3. Domestic element is simply a flat-rate subsidy to domestic 
ratepayers. It was introduced in 1966 when the Labour Government 
was concerned about the effect of rising rate pou~dages on its abi-
lity to maintain an incomes policy. Domestic element accounts for 
a rmch smaller percentage of RSG in Scotland than in either En<;;Jland 
or Wales. This is mainly because the rating revaluation of 1978 up-
valued industrial and co~nercial property by a higher factor than 
domestic property. The Secretary of State, very much with the app-
roval of the Scottish local authorities, took advantage of this 
to switch grant away from domestic element back towards needs and 
resources elements. 
In December each year the Government sets the level of RSG for 
the following financial year. The Local Government Finance Working 
Party and its associated committees, composed of Scottish Office 
officials and of COSLA representatives, are engaged throughout the 
year upon forecastin9, data collection and revaluation exercises 
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which provide the informational base for the operation of the RSG 
system. The key decisions are the setting of t:he RSG percentage and 
the base of relevant expenditure to which this percentage is app-
lied. In the past, the base tended 1:o correspond to a joint esti-
mate of the likely level of local government expenditure on rele-
vant services. More recently a clear link has been established be-
tween the Government's plans set out in the annual public expendi-
ture White Paper and the figures which subseq.rently appear in the 
RSG (Scotland) Order. Consequently, the role of local authorities 
in this joint exercise has become more limited. 
Table 3 shows how the Scottish RSG system operates. Having 
established the base of relevant expenditure being met by grant, 
there are a number of adjustments which must be made. An important 
source of confusion is that the RSG percentage (now 66.7%) is used 
to calculate the aggregate amount of grants within the RSG system 
and not the sum of needs, resources and domestic elements. A 
number of specific grat1ts, notably the 50% police grant, are ded-
ucted from the aggregate amount of grants to give the sum avail-
able for the three elements of RSG. If, for example, urban prog-
ramme grants are increased, there is less money available for RSG 
itself. 
In addition to these grants within the RSG system, there are 
a number of other grants. The most important is the Housing Support 
Grant, which was introduced in 1979-80 by the Labour Government. 
Earlier subsidy syste~s were historically based, with the rate of 
subsidy depending upon when particular houses were built rather 
than upon the current 'needs' of the local authority for Exchequer 
support. 
The new syste~ was designed to match subsidy distribution much 
more closely to the present pattern of need. A local authority's 
HSG is calculated by formula as the difference between its 'eli-
gible expenditure' and its 'relevant income'. The former includes 
standard allowances for management and maintenance, and actual 
loan charges. The latter consists of assumed income from rents and 
from rate fund contributions. 
The remaining grants are small but, for rather curious admin-
istrative· reasons, have never been assimilated into the RSG sys-
tem. Some of them have rather quaint origins such as the grants for 
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TABLE 3 GRANTS WITHIN THE SCOTTISH RSG SYSTEM : 1981-82 
A. Composition of relevant expenditure 
education, libraries and museums 
social work services 
law, order and protective services 
roads and transport 






Total Relevant Expenditure 
B. Grants 
aggregate amount of grants at 66.77. of 
relevant expenditure 
specific grants: police 
C. Elements of RSG 
domestic element 
resources element 

















































needs element (extraordinary expenses 
portion) 10. 8 } 




Scottish Office, The Rate Support Grant (Scotland) Order 1980, 
HC 63 of Session 1980-81, London: HMSO, 1980. 
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roads under the Co~gested Districts (Scotland) Act of 1897. The 
main features are clear even tho~gh the administrative and finan-
ccal complexities m~~e the grant system difficult to comprehend. 
Central government resources are crucially important in the 
financing of local services. Table 4 shows the proportion of ex-
penditure (other than for housing) financed by gra:1t for each of 
the 65 Scottish local authorities. This ranges in 1981-82 from 
22.8% for Falkirk District to 83.4% for Western Isles. The dis-
tribution of needs element on a weighted population rather than 
population basis '!leans that those authorities which have an above 
average proportion of the characteristics being 'rewarded' will 
attract an ab::)Ve a•Jerage proportion of grant. Similarly authori-
ties which have low per capita rateable values will be those most 
dependent upon resources element. Consequently the impact of any 
government policy which relies upon altering the structure and 
operation of RSG will vary between authorities. 
II The Government's P0lic~ Objec~ 
The Government not only wishes to cut public expenditure but 
also to alter its co'llposition in favour of defence and law and 
order and away from social pro9rammes such as housing and educa-
tion. These aims have led to growing pressure upon local authorities
which are the direct providers of many of the social programmes 
now assigned a lower priority in the Government's expenditure plan1~
ing. The 1980 public expenditure White Paper(l
2
) placed great em-
phasis upon reducing the public expenditure : GOP ratio over the 
survey period to 1983-34. Nevertheless, this ratio actually rose 
fro'll 41.5% in 1979-30 to 44.5% in 1980-81. 
The two main factors frustrating the Goverru'llent have been the 
recession and the dramatic growth of public sector costs. There is 
no comprehensive estimate available of the financial cost to the 
Exchequer of the present recession. Nevertheless, some indication 
of its importance is provided by the Treasury's own estimate that 
the full year financial cost in 1980-31 of each extra 100,000 un-
employed was £340m: this is a calculation of the direct costs 
and excludes 'second rou:1d' effects such as lower VAT receipts(l
3
). 
The relative price effect (RPE) was introduced into public 
expenditure planning in the 1970s to allow for the tendency for the 
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~ PROPORTION OF LOCAL EXPENDITURE FINANCED BY GRANT : 1981-82 
local authority Rate Support Grant specific total grant-borne 
needs resources grants expenditure 
element element 
-%- % % % 
Borders 52.7 13.3 5.4 71.4 
Berwickshire 28.1 19.5 9.2 56.8 
Ettrick & 
Lauderdale 27.0 16.3 9.1 52.4 
Roxburgh 23.7 21.2 6.9 51.8 
Tweed dale 25.6 10.1 8.4 44.1 
Central 52.4 - 4.3 56.7 
Clackmannan 22.5 9.2 1.9 33.6 
Falkirk 21.2 - 1.6 22.8 
Stirling 16.6 5.4 1.8 23.8 
Dumfries & 
Galloway 53.5 12.6 4.1 70.2 
Annandale & 
Eskdale 26.7 16.2 9.9 52.8 
Nithsdale 28.9 15.8 9.5 54.2 
Stewartry 30.0 16.4 10.4 56.8 
Wig town 31.8 14.9 10.8 57.5 
Fife 53.7 5.2 3.9 62.8 
Dunfermline 27.2 5.7 3.1 36.0 
Kirkcaldy 30.3 7.6 3.4 41.3 
N.E.· Fife 27.2 9.0 10.2 46.4 
Grampian 54.8 2.9 3.7 61.4 
Aberdeen 21.6 - 4.6 26.2 
Banff & Buchan 34.7 4.0 10.7 49.4 
Gordon 35.0 13.4 9.4 57.8 
Kincardine & 
Dee side 36.2 9.3 12.2 57.7 
Moray 29.1 7.9 7.7 44.7 
Notes: This Table excludes housing expenditure and housing grants. 
Figures for Borders and Dumfries & Galloway (where some district 
services are functions of the regional council) are inclusive of 
all services (district and regional). 
Source: Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, Scottish 
Branch, Rating Review, Hamilton, 1981. 
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TABLE 4 (Cont' d) 
PROPORTION OF LOCAL EXPENDITURE FINANCED BY GRANT : 1981-82 
local authority Rate Support Grant specific total grant-borne
needs resources grants expenditure 
element element 
r-- % % % 
Highland 61.1 5.4 3.0 69.5 
Badenoch & 
Strathspey 25.8 2.6 5.2 33.6 
Caithness 17.6 19.3 10.1 47.0 
Inverness 17.7 2.2 3.3 23.2 
Lochaber 20.3 7.9 1.3 29.5 
Nairn 20.5 18.9 5.9 45.3 
Ross & Cromarty 39.0 4.6 11.2 54.8 
Skye & Lochalsh 25.3 22.2 9.1 56.7 
Sutherland 22.5 21.9 14.6 59.0 
Lothian 43.1 - 4.8 47.9 
East Lothian 17.6 9.8 5.1 32.5 
Edinburgh 27.4 - 3.4 30.8 
Midlothian 18.3 21.8 1.3 41.4 
West Lothian 22.1 14.5 3.7 40.3 
Strathclyde 56.1 6.1 6.1 68.3 
Argyll & Bute 21.4 12.3 6.2 39.9 
Bearsden & 
Milngavie 30.5 8.8 0.2 39.5 
Clydebank 26.6 17.6 7.1 51.3 
Clydesdale 25.5 15.8 4.8 46.1 
Cumbernauld & 
Kilsyth 33.4 18.8 1.3 53.5 
Cumnock & 
Doon Valley 22. 7 32.7 1.7 57.1 
Cunninghame 21.2 2.5 1.7 25.4 
Dumbarton 18.5 3.5 3.1 25.1 
East Kilbride 27.1 5.3 1.0 33.4 
Eastwood 28.6 10.6 1.8 41.0 
Glasgow 26.4 3.7 5.3 35.4 
Notes: This Table excludes housing expenditure and housing grants. 
Figures for Highland Region (where some district services are 
functions of the regional council) are inclusive of all services 
(district and regional). 
Source: Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, Scottish 
Branch, Rating Review, Hamilton, 1981. 
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TABLE 4 (Cont' d) 
PROPORTION OF LOCAL EXPENDITURE FINANCED BY GRANT : 1981-82 
local authority Rate Support Grant specific total grant-borne 
needs resources grants expenditure 
element element 
% % % % 
Hamilton 22.7 23.7 1.2 47.6 
Inverclyde 25.0 9.1 4.9 39.0 
Kilmarnock & 
Loudoun 23.4 19.8 1.0 44.2 
Kyle & Carrick 21.7 5.8 2.5 30.0 
Monklands 20.5 18.3 1.9 40.7 
Motherwell 21.8 7.0 2.5 31.3 
Renfrew 21.6 ll.8 2.3 35.7 
Strathkelvin 24.5 22.8 0.7 48.0 
Tayside 50.7 7.3 5.4 63.4 
Angus 29.3 13.3 10.6 53.2 
Dundee 18.8 5.9 3.3 28.0 
Perth & Kinross 32.6 10.7 10.8 54.1 
Orkney 47.2 - 5.4 52.6 
Shetland 27.6 - 4.9 32.5 
Western Isles 61.6 18.4 3.4 83.4 
Notes: This Table excludes housing expenditure and housing grants. 
Island councils carry out both regional and district functions. 
Source: Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, Scottish 
Branch, Rating Review, Hamilton, 1981. 
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rate of growth of public sector costs to exceed that for the rest of
the economy. However, in recent years this long-term trend has been 
dominated by the increasingly erratic movements in the wage relati-
vities between the public and private sectors. For the three years 
up to and including 1979-80 the RPE was either non-existent or ne-
gative: it then became extremely high in 1980-81. Whereas the 
inflation rate in the rest of the economy was about 15% in the 
period November 1979 to November 1980, local government costs grew 
by about 25% over the same period. This was the result of higher 
interest rates and the timing of major public sector pay awards 
made under the auspices of the Clegg Commission. Consequently, it 
bec~~e very much more expensive in cash terms to maintain the exist
ing level of provision. 
Before examining how the Secretary of State has used changes 
to both the level and structure of grants as an instrument for 
control over local ailthorities, it is necessary to focus upon the 
objectives which ~e has been attempting to achieve. There are three
possible objectives: 
(a) to achieve the planned volume reduction in local govern-
ment expenditure as specified in the White Paper and 
RSG (Scotland) Order; 
(b) to prescribe the functional pattern of local government 
expenditure so that this matches the priorities estab-
lished in the White Paper; 
(c) to prescribe the territorial pattern of local government 
expenditure so that each local authority takes its pro-
per 'share' of cuts. 
Although these objectives are not mutually exclusive (for example, 
the Government could aim for all three simultaneously), distinguish-
ing them helps to clarify the issues. The Secretary of State's 
choice of objectives has important implications, both for the choice 
of policy instruments and for central-local relations. 
It has been far from clear that, either in Scotland or in 
England and Wales, the Government has itself known which combina-
tion of these objectives its grants policy is intended to achieve. 
It could pursue (a) by altering the broad parameters of RSG (e.g. 
cutting either the base or percentage) but leaving both the func-
tional and territorial patterns to local decisions. Yet, despite 
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TABLE 5 THE GOVERNMENT'S SPENDING PLANS: CHANGES IN THE SECRETARY OF 
STATE'S SPENDING FROM 1979-80 
EXPENDITURE OUTSIDE BLOCK 
15.1 agriculture, fisheries, food 
and forestry 
15.2 industry, energy, trade and 
employment (excluding 
tourisr.J) 
15.3 other public services 
15.4 common services 
Sub-Total 
EXPENDITURE WITHIN BLOCK 
15.3 industry, energy, trade and 
employment (tourism only) 
15.4 transport 
15.5 housing 
15.6 other environmental services 
15.7 law, order and protective 
services 
15.8 education and science, 
arts and libraries 
15.9 health and personal social 
services 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE \nTH IN 







































































































~: Because of rounding, figures do not necessarily sum to 
the totals. 
Source: Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, Government 
------ Economic Strategy: The COSLA Critique, Edinburgh: 
1981, pp.32-33. 
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the emphasis it has placed upon (a) as the key objective, the in-
struments it has chosen imply an entirely new emphasis upon (c). 
The Govern~ent has begu~ to set and attempt to enforce 'reasonable' 
spending levels for each local authority. Such developments have 
profound implications for the future role of local authorities. 
Table 5 analyses the expenditure priorities of the Secretary 
of State as set out in the 1981 public expenditure White Paper(l
4
). 
It confirms the very low priority he attaches to major local auch-
ority services such as education and housing (scheduled to fall in 
real terms over the period 1979-80 to 1983-84 by 9.5% and 39.9% 
respectively). Table 6 shows that, as the size of the Secretary of 
State's expenditure block has fallen, the bulk of the burden of 
adjustment has fallen upon local authorities. From the mid 1970s 
the expenditure of local authorities has been fallin9 in real terms
at 1980 survey prices, fro~ £2,664m in 1975-76 to £2,218m in 1981-
82, a fall of 16.1%. In contrast, the central government component 
of the Secretary of State's expenditure has increased by 10.7%. If 
there is a runaway train, it is not powered by local government. 
Rather than local government expenditure being out of control and 
rising too quickly, local authorities have cut spending - but not 
as quickly as the Secretary of State would like(l
5
). Most of the 
cuts have been in capital expenditure whereas current expenditure 
has remained stable. The next section examines the policy instru-
ments the Government has used in its attempts to secure further 
reductions. 
III The Government's Policy Instruments 
The Government has many different instruments which it can use 
either separately or together. The list in this section shows their 
number and diversity. No signific~,ce should be attached to the or-
der in which these are now discussed. 
1. Cut the RSG percentage 
The Conservative Government left 
the RSG percentage unchanged at 68.5% for 1980-81 and then cut it 
by one percentage point for 1981-82(
16
). In fact, it has so far 
made comparatively little use of this instrument. The large falls 
which are shown in column 4 of Table 7 were imposed by the previous 
Labour GoverTh~ent. 
2. Cut the base of relevant exoenditure 
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to which this percentage is applied is no longer an agreed figure 
but is derived fro~ the latest public expenditure White Paper's 
provision for the settle~ent year (taking into account any subse-
quent revisions). Given the minimal level of public understandin9 
of how RSG works, cutting the base is a more attractive (because 
less visible) option to the Govern~ent than cutting the percentage. 
This means that grant is likely to meet a lower percentage 
tual e~Jenditure than it does of relevant expenditure (see 
erence between column 5 and column 6 of Table 7). 
3. Alter the balance between needs and resources elements 
sources element has been criticised for rewarding high spenders 
cause, by setting a higher rate, those local authorities in receipt
of it can increase their share of the fixed amount the Government 
has set aside. The ratio between needs and resources elements has 
traditionally been set at 4:1. The Government changed this to 7:1 
i:-1 1980-81 and 9:1 in 1981-82. This •saving' in resources element 
was then distributed as an addition to the population factor in 
the needs element. This change deliberately moved grant away from 
low tax-base/high-spending authorities to high tax-base/low-
spending authorities. 
As a result of these actions, resources equalisatio:> (i.e. 
equalisation of tax bases) is now far less co~plete in Scotland 
than it used to be. Oil development has greatly increased the tax 
bases of Orkney and Shetland Islands Councils and given the~ per 
capita rateable values far above the •national standard amount•{l
7
). 
A smaller resources element (and hence a lower •national standard 
amount') has meant that Central and Lothian Regional Councils, 
A~erdeen, Edinburgh and Falkirk District Councils, as well as 
Orkney and Shetland, no longer receive it. Ironically, this Scott-
ish move away from full resources equalisation has occurred just 
as England has adopted the block grant, partly out of a desire to 
achieve it. This particular change in Scotland was presented by 
the Secretary of State as a way of controlling local government 
expenditure without introducing the block grant. 
4. Enforce cash limits The-se are ceilings upon wage and price 
increases for which extra money will be provided. Although cash 
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for local government apply not to expenditure but to RSG. lf actual 
inflation is greater than allowed for, RSG is worth less in real 
terms. Cash limits wer.e introduced in 1976-77 by the Labour Gover-
nment. As an incomes policy was then in operation, it was not too 
difficult to produce reasonable estimates of future wage and price 
increases. Consequently, although cash limits did squeeze volu~e 
expenditure, the extent of this was limited. Without an incomes 
policy there is far less basis for setting cash limits. The Gov-
ernment has used cash limits as a back-door method of cutting the 
volume of expenditure: no public announcements of such cuts have 
to be made. It also faces the dilemma that any statement it m~<es 
about the likely inflation rate will influence the subsequent le-
vel of wage settlements. 
The impact of cash limits can be seen from Table 7 which shows 
a further reason why the proportion of relevant expenditure met by 
grant has been substantially lower than the official percentage. 
For example, in both 1979-80 and 1980-81 the percentage of Order 
level expenditure met by grant (column 5) was four percentage 
points below the official percentage (column 4). Cash limits have 
been used as an unofficial public sector pay policy. For 1981-82, 
the cash limit on RSG only provides for 6% increases in wage costs 
and 11% increases in other costs: these are likely to be well be-
low the actual figures. Through the use of cash limits set at this 
level, the Government is seeking to claw back part of the gains 
which public sector employees received from Clegg settlements. 
5. Pu~lish expenditure guidelines The Scottish Office publishes
guideline figures for each local authority which, taken together, 
are consistent with the expenditure level set in the RSG (Scotland) 
Order. This looks like a central assessment of local expenditure 
needs but such an appearance is rather deceptive. The methods of 
calculation have resulted in an individual authority's guideline 
being heavily influenced by its previous levels of expenditure. A 
traditionally high spender would thus receive a high guideline and 
vice versa. Furthermore, changes in political control are likely to 
produce deviations between such historically-based guidelines and 
current spending. There has recently been a move to weaken the link 
between past expenditure and current guidelines. The 1981-82 guide-
lines 't~<e account of the assessment of expenditure needs implicit 
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in the demographic formula used to distribute the needs (general) 
element of RSG, modified by the level of previous guidelines (in 
order to avoid undue variations from one year to another)•( 18 l. 
Initially, COSLA welcomed the publication of such guidelines, 
but when it changed its view the Secretary of State proceeded re-
gardless. Hitherto, the main use of guidelines has been by the press 
to identify certain councils as 'spendthrift'. Performance against 
guidelines is one of the criteria now bein9 used for the withdrawal 
of RSG for 'excessive and unreasonable expenditure'. 
6. Cut Housing Support Grant Because of the existence of the 
separate HSG upon which district councils are highly dependent, the 
Secretary of State has been able to direct cuts towards housing ex-
penditure. In 1981-82 HSG was cut by 44.8% in real terms compared 
to 2.7% off RSG. This is a clear example of the Government imposing 
White Paper expenditure priorities U?On local authorities. Although 
local authorities have not delivered the full rent increases asked 
for, the increases have been unprecedentedly high. For example, in-
stead of £1. 40 as the Secretary of State wanted in 1980·-81, the 
average rent increase was 97p; and instead of £2.35 in 1981-82 it 
was £1.84. Large increases in the assumed rent income automatically 
bring about reductions in HSG. Table 8 shows the reductions in HSG 
TABLE 8 THE EROSION OF HOUSING SUPPORT GRANT 
A. ELIGIBLE EXPENDITURE 
1. loan charges 
2. repairs and maintenance 
3. supervision and management 
4. other expenditure 
total estimated expenditure 
B. RELEVA.lllT INCOME 
1. local contributions (i.e. 
standard rental income and 
rate ftind contributions 
combined) 
2., other income 
total estimated income 
C. HOUSING SUPPORT GRANT (A - B) 
~: Hansard, 13th April 1981, 
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£m at November 1980 prices 
1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 
402.6 405.3 361.3 
125.9 133.9 131.5 
43.7 46.6 45.7 
10.6 10.3 8.9 --- --- ---
582.8 596.1 547.4 -- --- --
£m £m £m 
322.1 351.7 404.g 
10.5 11.8 14.1 ---
363.5 ---332.6 419.0 --- --- ---
250.2 232.6 128.4 
col 33. 
imposed by the Government. Some local authorities (e.g. Nithsdale, 
Cumbernauld & Kilsyth, and Eastwood) may £all out o£ the HSG sys-
tem completely in 1982-83, a development made possible by the Local 
Government (Miscellaneous Provisions)(Scotland) Act 1981. 
7. Publicise Manpower Watch statistics The Secretary o£ State 
has frequently contrasted the continued growth o£ local government 
manpower in Scotland with the decline in Engla~d and Wales. He has 
also cited reductions in Scottish O££ice manpower as an ex~mple to 
be followed and reminded local authorities o£ their response to the 
previous Labour Goverlli~ent's call £or manpower reductions (12,000 
£ewer £ull-time equivalents between June 1976 a~d December 1977). 
Publicity about manpower levels is very much part o£ the growing 
battle to win over public opinion. However, in contrast to Eng-
land and Wales the employment statistics £or individual councils 
are still not published. 
8. Use unrelated sanctions The Secretary o£ State's control 
over each local authority's capital progr~mme is near absolute. He 
has used this as a method o£ punishing individual local authorities 
£or revenue decisions o£ which he disapproves. In 1980-81, the 
Secretary o£ State re£used to give consent under Section 94 o£ 
the Lo~al Government (Scotland) Act 1973 to Lothian Regional Cou~­
cil's capital programme and ordered that each project be vetted 
separately. The Scottish Of£ice subsequently claimed that this had 
saved £11.6m by holding down Lothian's capital spending to £42.8m 
when its budget was £54.4m. 
In 1981-82, 27 local authorities have had their housing capi-
tal allocations reduced below the 'provisional maximum' because o£ 
rate £und contributions to housing revenue accounts above the Sec-
retary o£ State's guidelines. Table 9 illustrates this use o£ capi-
tal allocations as a sanction against revenue decisions. For every 
pound an individual authority was above its rate £und contribution 
guideline, the Secretary o£ State removed a pound o£ capital allo-
cation (subject to a minimum allocation). The GoverTh~ent•s view is 
that in order to contain Scottish local government expenditure with-
in the White Paper plans, excessive revenue spending must mea~ lower 
capital spending. Rather than penalise all councils including those 
which have conformed to the Government's guidelines, the Government 
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TABLE 9 RATE FUND CONTRIBUTIONS AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION : 1981-82 ---
Em at estimated outturn prices 
district or RFC budgeted provisional provisional capital 
island council guideline RFC maximum minimum allocation 
capital capital received 
allocation allocation 
Berwickshire 0.212 - 0.950 0.720 0.950 
Ettrick & 
Lauderdale 0.398 - 0.835 0.455 0.835 
Roxburgh 0.426 0.191 3.290 2.530 2.680 
:rweeddale 0.166 0.167 0.500 0.415 0.415 
Clackmannan 0.578 1.456 2.700 1.830 1.830* 
Falkirk 1. 731 3.951 5.945 3.940 3. 940* 
Stirling 0.957 3.790 5.420 4.335 4.335* 
Annandale & 
Eskdale 0.422 0.422 4.045 3.555 4.045 
Nithsdale 0.666 0.650 2.245 1.595 2.245 
Stewartry 0.269 0.128 1.455 1.280 1.455 
Wig town 0.354 0.102 1. 755 1.445 1.755 
Dunfermline 1.528 1.~03 4.400 2.745 4.475+ 
Kirkcaldy 1. 795 1. 755 6.870 4.850 6.870 
N.E. Fife o. 775 0.264 3.570 3.345 3.570 
Aberdeen 2.514 7.833 13.610 10.030 10.030* 
Banff & Buchan 0.964 - 3.965 2.930 3.965 
Gordon 0.744 0.739 
Kincardine & 
3.990 2.865 3.990 
Dee side 0.491 0.390 2.680 2.345 2.680 
Moray 0.992 - 5.000 4.860 5.000 
Notes: 
+ local authorities suffering a £ for £ withdrawal of capital allocation; 
* local authorities suffering a £ for £ withdrawal but protected by the 
'floor' of provisional minimum capital allocation. 
29 councils breached their RFC guideline but only 27 lost part of their 
capital allocation. Two councils (including Tweeddale) were protected by 
capital allocations being rounded up to the nearest £5,000. 
Following representations to the Secretary of State and a reassessment by 
him of housing needs, 8 authorities secured an increase in their maximum 
capital allocation in April 1981 above the provisional maximum announced 
in December 1980 (including Dunfermline, to £4.550m). Two councils 
requested decreases (Roxburgh, to £2.680m and Tweeddale, to £0.415m). 
Source: Hansard, 29th January 1981, cols. 460-462; 5th March 1981, 
--- cols. 182-186; and 31st July 1981, cols. 599-601. 
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TABLE 9 (Cont'd) RATE FUND CONTRIBUTIONS AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION : 1981-82
£m at estimated outturn prices 
district or RFC budgeted provisional provisional 
capital 
island council guideline RFC maximum minimum 
allocation 
capital capital received 
allocation allocation 
Badenoch & 
Strathspey 0.114 O.ll3 1.320 
1.230 1.570 
Caithness 0.323 0.323 1. 720 
1.245 1.720 
Inverness 0.673 1.191 3.500 
3.200 3.200* 
Lochaber 0.244 0.521 2.405 
2.000 2 .130+ 
Nairn 0.128 0.170 1.060 
0.525 1.020+ 
Ross & Cromarty 0.545 0.468 2.615 2.145 
2.615 
Skye & Lochalsh 0.122 0.125 0.675 0.625 
0.675 
Sutherland 0.157 0.157 o. 700 0.515 0. 700 
East Lothian 0.944 0. 708 4.100 2. 705 
4.100 
Edinburgh 5.427 4.200 12.025 7.950 
12.025 
Midlothian 1.019 1.556 2.905 1.880 
2.370+ 
West Lothian 1.622 1.622 2.640 0.955 
3.140 
Argyll & Bute 0.768 0.845 4.100 3.590 
4.025+ 
Bearsden & 
Milngavie 0.470 0.577 0.820 
0.625 0.715+ 
Clyde bank 0.623 0.630 2.580 
1.940 2.575+ 
Clydesdale 0.685 0.613 1.255 
0.680 1.255 
Cumbernauld & 
Kilsyth 0.795 o. 793 1.150 0.910 1.150 
Cumnock & Doon 
vailey 0.551 1.111 2.115 
1.390 1.805+ 
Cunninghame 1. 642 2.254 5.435 
2.435 4.825+ 
Notes: 
+ local authorities suffering a £ for £ withdrawal of capital allocation; 
* local authorities suffering a £ for £ withdrawal but protected by the 
'floor' of provisional minimum capital allocation. 
29 councils breached their RFC guideline but only 27 lost part of their 
capital allocation. Two councils (including Skye & Lochalsh) were 
protected by capital allocations being rounded up to the nearest £5,000. 
Following representations to the Secretary of State and a reassessment by 
him of housing needs, 8 authorities secured an increase in their maximum 
capital allocation in April 1981 above the provisional maximum announced 
in December 1980 (including Badenoch & Strathspey, to £1.570m; West Loth1an
to £3.140m; and Cumnock & Doon Valley, to £2.365m). 
Source: Hansard, 29th January 1981, eels. 460-462; 5th March 1981, 
eels. 182-186; and 31st July 1981, eels. 599-601. 
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TABLE 9 (Cont'd) RATE FUND CONTRIBUTIONS AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION : 1981-82 
£m at estimated outturn prices 
district or RFC budgeted provisional provisional capital 
island council guideline RFC maximum minimum allocation 
capital capital received 
allocation allocation 
Dumbarton 0.947 2.153 2.510 1.600 2 .100* 
East Kilbride 1.000 0.449 0. 730 0.580 0.730 
Eastwood 0.623 0.363 0.280 0.130 0.280 
Glasgow 9.307 38.380 66.000 55.310 55.310* 
Hamilton 1.294 5.253 6.765 4.625 4.625* 
Inverclyde 1.228 2.091 4.160 2.255 3.295+ 
Kilmarnock & 
Loudoun 0.976 1.200 2.510 1.430 2.290+ 
Kyle & Carrick 1.335 2.010 4.360 2.920 3.685+ 
Monklands 1.309 4.963 7.930 5.510 5.510* 
Motherwell 1. 792 4.659 10.835 7.405 7.970+ 
Renfrew 2.607 4.888 9.510 6.360 7.230+ 
Strathkelvin 1.047 1.422 4.030 3.355 3.855+ 
Angus 1.113 - 2.765 1.675 3.265 
Dundee 2.280 5.704 8.185 4.900 4.900* 
Perth & Kinross 1.436 - 2.840 3.050 3.150 
Orkney 0.220 0.469 0.820 0.705 o. 705* 
Shetland 0.575 0.575 3.400 3.000 3.400 
Western Isles 0.358 1.201 3.465 3.125 3.125* 
Scotland 62.281 117.198 267.440 200.550 232.105 
Notes: 
+ local authorities suffering a £ for £ withdrawal of capital allocation; 
* local authorities suffering a £ for £ withdrawal but protected by the 
'floor' of provisional minimum capital allocation. 
Capital allocations were rounded up to the nearest £5,000. 
Following representations to the Secretary of State and a reassessment by 
him of housing needs, 8 authorities secured an increase in their maximum 
capital allocation in April 1981 above the provisional maximum announced 
in December 1980 (including Angus, to £3.265m; Dumbarton, to £3.010m; 
Perth & Kinross, to £3.150m; and Strathkelvin, to £4.230m). The entry 
in column 3 for Perth & Kinross represents a reduced programme which was 
subsequently increased. 
Source: Hansard, 29th January 1981, eels. 460-462; 5th March 1981, 
eels. 182-186; and 31st July 1981, eels. 599-601. 
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has used its powers over capital progr~~es to direct these extra 
cuts at 'overspenders'. 
9. Threaten to use existing powers The Secretary of State 
already possessed powers to reduce the RSG of an individual local 
authority. Under section 5 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 
1966, the Secretary of State has been empowered to reduce any ele-
ment of RSG where he is satisfied that a local authority has failed 
to achieve or maintain a reasonable standard in dischargin:J its 
functio~s or where he is satisfied that the expenditure of a local 
authority has been 'excessive and unreasonable'. In addition to 
this power to reduce any element of RSG, he could also calculate 
a local authority's entitlement to resources element on the basis 
of a lower poundage than the actual one. These powers, which wo:Ild 
be exercised after the end of a financial year, have not yet been 
used - indeed they had largely been forgotten. I• the early part 
of 1980 the Government made a growing number of references to the 
possible use of these powers notin9 that these were contained in 
legislation passed by previous Labour Governments(l9 ). 
10. Threaten new powers After the publication of the plans 
for the block grant in England and Wales, the Secretary of State 
and his junior ministers consistently warned that new powers wo:Ild 
have to be taken if Scottish local authorities failed to conform to 
the Government's call for expenditure and manpower reductions. These
threats were designed to exert pressure upon local authorities to 
fall 'voluntarily' into line. 
11. T~~e new powers Despite this armoury of existing policy 
instruments, the Government eventually decided that it did require 
new powers. In November 1980, it published the Local Govern~ent 
(Miscellaneous Provisions)(Scotland) Bill. This was at least in 
part a direct response to what it saw as deliberate provocation 
by Lothian Regional Council. Lothian was not only determined to 
expand its services despite Government policy but also to publicise 
its defiance. The pressures U?On the Secretary of State to take new 
powers which would enable him to answer this challenge directly 
proved irresistible. 
This Bill received royal assent in June 1981. It allows the 
Secretary of State to withdraw RSG from individual local authori-
ties o~ the basis of their bud9ets. The formal powers are exactly 
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the s~11e as before: only the timin9 differs. However, there are 
important practical differences. Under the old powers, the Secre-
tary of State could act only at the end of the financial year -
after the spending had already taken place. Under the new powers, 
he can remove grant from any local authority as soon as it has 
announced its budget- before it incurs the expenditure. 
As Scottish local authorities do not possess supplementary 
rate powers (unlike their En9lish counterparts), any local authori-
ty which loses grant in this way is in a very difficult financial 
position. There was some dispute about whether a local authority 
would be able to undertake temporary borrowing to compensate for 
Joss of grant. However, after Midwinter was q.1oted in The Scots-
.!!!.e.'l(ZO) sayin9 that local authorities could carry forward the de-
ficit to the following year, the Government produced a new clause 
(now section 18) requiring local authorities to receive the Sec-
retary of State's consent for such temporary borrowing. Also at 
the report stage, the Goverlli~ent introduced a new clause (now 
section 15) which allows local authorities, faced with grant reduc-
tions, to cut their budgets, recover this graat and make refunds to 
ratepayers. S:Ich a course of action does not save the Government 
any money but enables it to present itself as the defender of rate-
payers' interests. 
Faced with grant reductions halfway throU<;jh the financial year, 
a local authority would have few options. Manpower reductions or 
increased charges would have to be extremely abrupt becaase it 
would be trying to m~~e a twelve month saving within the remaining 
part of the financial year. The time available wm1ld be shortened 
by the need to give warnin-g of redundancies or increased charges. 
Unable either to levy a supplementary rate or to borrow, a local 
authority refusing to take these steps would be hemmed in. Very 
quickly the local authority would run out of cash, and employees 
and suppliers would not be paid. The question of surcharges upon 
individual councillors would immediately arise. 
Having secured these new powers, the Secretary of State clear-
ly intended to use them. Their detailed implementation for financial 
year 1981-82 is discussed in the subsequent section. This discussion 
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of the available policy instruments has demonstrated both their ex-
tensiveness and the obvious frustration of the Secretary o£ State 
that they did n.ot allow him to discriminate sufficiently between in-
dividual a:.1thorities. Both the use of capital allocations and the 
powers of selective grru<t withdrawal reflect a shift of emphasis 
away £rom controlling aggregates towards controlling the expenditure 
of individual cou:.cils. 
IV Selective Withdrawal of RSG 
Anticipating the Act receivin9 royal assent, the Secretary of 
State warned 7 councils on 3rd June 1981 that he considered their 
expenditure 'excessive and unreasonable'. The councils affected and 
the sums by which grant would be reduced were as follows: Lothian 
Region (£53m}; Cumnock and Doon Valley District (£0.45m}; Dum-
barton District (£0.75m}; Dundee District (£2.75m); East Lothian 
District (£1. 35m); Renfrew District (£3. Sm); and Stirling District 
(£1.25m). The Govermnent also warned that other authorities might 
be included on a subsequent list. Through this selective action 
(amountin9 to £63m) and a general reduction, the Secretary of State 
has announced his intention to withhold £100m of RSG for 1981-82 as 
his response to budgeted expenditure being £183m above guidelines. 
Furthermore, he has said that he will withdraw up to £60m of RSG 
already paid over for 1980-81. This will happen because it is esti-
mated that actual local authority expenditure for 1980-81 will turn 
out to have been £83m above guidelines: this can be done under the 
1966 Act. 
The House of Commons approved orders on 21st July authorisin9 
the withdrawal of RSG from 3 authorities: Lothian (£47m); Dundee 
(£2m); ru1d Stirling (£1m)( 2 l)_ The Secretary of State did not at 
that time take action against the other 4 councils. He has indicated
that he is satisfied with the reply of Cumnock and Doon Valley which
offered both explanations and expenditure cuts of £100,000. However,
an Order is expected to be laid against the others in October(
22
). 
The selective reductions so far approved only add up to £50m and 
the Secretary of State gave indications during the debate that he 
would be willing to compromise at lower figures. The more he com-
promises with these authorities, the greater must be the general 
reductions. 
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The Secretary of State has removed a pound of grant for each 
pound of expenditure he considers to be 'excessive and unreasonable'. 
Local authorities do not know where the Secretary of State will draw 
the line. Once these provisions are used, the Secretary of State is 
likely to relate the scale of grant withdrawal to~ spending above 
his assessment of expenditure need. In contrast, a local authority 
which spends more than its centrally assessed expenditure need but 
does not cross the line, loses no grant. Therefore, so much depends 
upon where such lines are drawn. 
The 1981 Act allows the Secretary of State, in deciding whether 
budgeted expenditure is 'excessive and unreasonable', to have refer-
ence to: 
(i) the expenditure of other authorities which are as 
closely comparable as practicable; 
(ii) general economic conditions; 
(iii) 'such other financial, economic, demographic, geo-
graphical and like criteria as he considers approp-
riate'. 
This final provision confers almost complete discretion upon the 
Secretary of State to establish the criteria. Those used for 1981-
82 are: 
(a) comparison of guidelines and expenditure; 
(b) expenditure per capita in relation to 'closely compar-
able' authorities; 
(c) trends in expenditure since 1978-79; 
(d) the rating effects of expenditure decisions; 
(e) changes in population size and structure. 
Table 10 summarizes the available data for all Scottish local auth-
orities on criteria (a) to (d). Criterion (e) cannot be summarized 
as easily and has been excluded. 
Much of the debate has been conducted in terms of performance 
against expenditure guidelines. Yet as the column headed Criterion 
A in Table 10 shows only 5 out of 65 local authorities have bud-
geted in 1981-82 for expenditure at or below their guidelines. In-
deed 28 councils are more than 20% above and 42 are 10% above. This 
indicated that the Government's problem extends far beyond a few 
'difficult' councils. At 24.7% above its guideline, Lothian is 
clearly at outlier amongst the regions. Nevertheless, it is far 
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!lli!.l.Q LOCAL AUTIIORITIES AND 1'11£ CRITERIA FOR GRANT 1fi1'1101lAifAL 
CRITERION /1 CRITERION 0 CRlTERlOH C CHITERlOH D 
PERFORMANCE AOAIHST GUIDELINES EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA CIIANGE IN VOLUME: RATF. POU/lOAGES 
' over/under change 
change in ehanRe 





e;w;pendl ture guidel1 ne 
s s s !m ' s s t p t 
s 
--- --- -- ---- -- --- --
Borders - 1.9 - 0, 7 0.3 
2. 7 0.94 361.1 4.9 3.9 0. 7 76 20.6 94.8 
~Ckshire -10.0 -22.1 5.0 
32.5 - 7.1 - 9.5 -18.6 10 
Ettrick I Lauderdale -18.5 17.3 12.2 
26.8 0. 26 37.3 15.5 16.0 -25.4 9 25,0 - 6. 2 
Roxburgh -13.2 17.5 0.8 7 .. 0 
0.08 34.9 o. 3 - 1.6 -20.1 13.9 39.0 19.8 
Tweed dale -36.4 -22.2 -14.9 •. 3 
0.02 3!L6 40.7 40.0 -1-1.5 8 8.1 
Central 5.1 - 0., 1.4 
3,6 3.10 328.5 2.8 2.4 3.9 68 
25.9 78.9 
Clackmnnnrw - 0.9 - 3.0 - 9. 2 
14.7 0,33 ~3.~ 11.9 11.7 -3.4 25 
38.9 6G, 7 
Fa.1kirk - 3.9 8.0 - 8.6 
4.9 0.36 53.1 - 3.3 - 3.5 -11.7 .. 13.6 17.1 
Stir line 3.5 13.7 7.6 
42.0 1.46 62.2 29,0 28.6 - 6.2 40 122.2 150.0 
""' 
Dumfries l Gallowa~ - 3,0 - 0.5 - 0,6 
- o.:z -0.09 332.8 2.6 1.8 - 1.0 68 21.1 78.9 
tv Annnndale i Eskdale -12.1 
15.9 22.8 23.1 0.21 31.9 19,0 19.1 
-15.0 10 25,0 
Hi thsd;~,le -20.4. -19.8 0.6 
29.6 - 5.4. - 6.2 -25.3 12 50.0 140.0 
Stewartry - 6.8 - 1.3 16.7 18.5 
0.12 34,6 12.3 11.6 -12.2 10 12.9 
100.tJ 
Wig town -19.8 -14 .o 6.5 19.7 0.15 31.0 14 .o 
12.3 -24.8 7 
Fife 1.2 1.7 
6.1 6.9 7.30 330.0 7.2 6.4 
0. 7 69 25.5 115.6 
15'Uii1ermline -19.0 7 0 7 
25,5 30,6 1.33 45.1 11.8 16.2 -28.0 
17 21.4 <11. 7 
KirkCo.ldy - 5,3 14.1 
25.3 25,4 1.50 49.5 9,8 9,6 
-17.3 21 55,6 133.3 
North-East Fife 5.8 - 3.1 7.9 
12.1 0.3:5 49.8 .. 0.4. - 1. 5 -7,1 16 
77.8 
GramE..!....eE. - 0.6 - 0,2 
1.4 2.9 4. ,46 329.4 2.1 3.8 
0.2 66 11. !J 61.0 
i\be"rdeen -10.5 16.5 20.6 
33.2 2,84 54,5 23.9 24.1 -16.7 
30.5 -13.5 117,9 
Danff a. Buchan -27.9 - 8.2 62' 8 38.5 0.95 
42.9 2!l.2 31.0 -31.8 9 
-30.8 
Gordon -19.2 -30.4 
35.1 36 .o 0,82 51,5 51.9 59.8 - 5.0 10 -23.1 
-23.1 
Kinc:Hdine a. Oeeslde -16.9 -16,9 21.2 0.9 0.01 28.3 
- 8.4 - 4.2 -21.1 8 
Moray -19.2 - 5.0 10.1 
35,0 0.99 46 :o 21.7 24.0 -25.7 12 -20.0 -14.3 
H;5~~~~~ l Stra thspey 
-1.9 3. 7 2,7 3.1 2.33 
399.2 12,5 14.1 9. 5 80 25.0 
110.5 
3.3 16.7 13.3 13.3 0.04 36.2 
12.1 9. 7 11 22.2 57.1 
Ca.i thness -25.8 22.0 19' 1 
33,3 0.27 40.0 21.6 21.3 -32.5 
14 4.0.0 
lnvcrne:;s - 0.5 16.2 11 ,'I 
15.5 0.30 39.5 • .a 6. 7 -8.1 17 30.8 70.0 
Lochnher -19.8 10.3 31.8 
35.0 0. 21 40.6 25.7 24,6 -25.9 
22 15.8 22.2 
Nairn 17.1 36.4 2.9 
- 3.1 -0.01 29,8 -26.1 -24.4 - 8.6 
13 30,0 44.4 
Ross &. Cromarty - 4.6 16.9 9.1 
9,0 0.12 32.4 - 5.3 - 0.7 -13.1 12 
-7.7 -4.2.9 
Skye r.: Loch a lsh 18.2 16.7 14,8 
14.8 0.04 30.6 18.6 19.2 22.7 
15 15.<1 87.5 
Suthnrland 23.4 - 3,5 - 1. 75 
5. 7 0.03 42.5 - 3.2 -3.4 12.8 
16 - 5,9 - 5.9 
~: COSLA, Statistics on Local Authoritl ExEenditure, 
mimeo, 1981. 
TABLE 10 (Cont'd) LOCAL AUTIIORITIES AND TirE CRI1'ERIA FOR GRANT IYITIIDRAifAL 
CRITERION A CRITERION D CRITERION C ciii'J'f:R IOH D 
PErlfOilNANCE IIGAINST GUIDELINES EXPENDITURE PEil CAP11'A CHANGE IN VOLum:;: RATF; POUNDAGES 
s· ovnrjunder change clnwgc in ehanae 
1978-79 1979-60 1980-81 1981-82 1981-82 1978-79 to 1978-79 to 1981-82 1981-82 1981-82 1978-79 to 
1981-82 author1 ty's Scottish Office 1981-82 
expendl ture Kuideli ne 
' !m ' \ s t -- ---- -----
Lothi:tn 0.6 4.3 11.7 24.7 63.20 426.4 22,4 22.1 - 1.5 112 49.3 1!:14.5 
EdTiib\il-gh 4.1 4.5 4.3 15.3 3. 40 56.5 8. 2 7.2 -3.7 22.5 15.1 60,7 
East Lothian 6.6 4.4 23 3 44.5 1.51 62,3 37.8 37,6 ~11 .0 24.5 ?.:J .G 75,0 
lolidlotldan 16,9 17.0 15.2 21.8 0,77 50,7 10.2 10.8 6. 3 22 10.0 69.2 
\fest Lothil\n ~17. 3 3.4 35 7 39 ,2· 1.63 43,7 24,5 26.1 -25.0 20 ll .1 48.1 
iffi{~~te 
- 0.9 - 2,9 2.9 3,6 32.39 382.6 3. 2 2.0 - 2.5 80 37.9 116.2 
50.2 8.1 7.1 25.4 1.11 85.2 18.0 17,3 40.5 ,. 29.6 75,0 
Dearsclcn It lol.tlngRvie 6.3 7,3 10.4 25.6 0.46 57.7 20.7 21.5 2.9 24 20.0 50.0 
C1ydc1Jnnk 12.3 - 3.8 17.5 21.9 0.62 66.5 - 3.3 - 7.5 -14.6 ,. 35.7 52,0 
""' 
Clydesdnle - 9 .o - 5.9 6.9 9 0 7 0.25 49.7 2.1 3,3 -14.3 17 41.7 
(;.) Cumbernnuld It Kilsyth -7.6 5.4 20,9 25.5 0.63 48.0 28.0 33,6 - 1.6 25 108,3 127.3 
Cumnock l Ooon V11.lley -26.3 2. 7 23.8 34.9 0.58 48.8 28.8 26.6 -3o. a 29 38.1 81.3 
Cunninghnme 20.6 9.9 14 .9 26.3 1.74 61.5 16.0 16.9 11.6 30 30.4 100.0 
Oumbar ton 14.9 9 0 7 10.3 27.3 1.05 61.6 11.6 11,6 0.8 35 20.7 75,0 
Enst Kilbride 7 0 3 - 5.2 11 .2 20.1 o. 78 56,3 14.7 13.4 1.3 21 23.5 90.9 
Eastwood 22.1 4.2 23.6 12.3 0.28 (9,1 -14.3 -13.0 -5.4 18 12.5 28.6 
Gl11.sgow 25.9 15,8 12.8 19.9 10.92 84.2 7 0 8 4.1 9.3 48 37.1 81.1 
llam11 ton - 3.9 - 5.8 5.6 12.2 0.54 48.3 1.1 1.4 -13.1 36 56.5 89.5 
Jnvcrclyde 7. 7 6.9 -8,7 11.0 0.55 55.0 o. 7 - 1.4 -4.4 30 50,0 50,0 
Kilmarnock It Loudoun 3.2 2. 2 4.4 1:5.8 0,60 :53.8 0.5 5,8 - 5. 7 29 26.1 81.3 
Kylr. t. Carrick 16.5 -13.7 -10.2 4 0 7 0.30 09 .• 2.1 2.0 13.5 29 61.1 81.3 
Nonkl!!.nds 3. 3 14.7 17.9 22.4 1.08 54.0 6.1 5. 4 -11.1 37,5 27.1 63.0 
Notherwell - 4.0 0,3 - 1. 2 9.2 0.65 50.9 4. 3 3,2 - 9.3 29.5 13.5 96.7 
Renfrew 18.2 8.0 19.9 38.7 4.51 75.4 24,0 24..7 6. 3 35.5 57.8 97.2 
Strl\thkclvin 7 0 9 - 8.0 17.<1 19.7 0.81 56,4 15.3 20.0 8.1 27 2R 6 100.0 
I~~~! de 0.9 - 3, 8 -2 6 4 0 7 6.16 342.3 3.2 2.2 1.5 75 36. 'I 108,3 - 1. 7 2. 6 8.0 0.30 44.,0 - 2.0 - 2. 2 -11 .0 13 18.2 30.0 
Dundee - 0.5 5.0 ll.O 44 ,5 3,52 00,6 23.7 21.7 -IG .2 ,. 150.0 84.2 
Perth I. Kinross -12.8 2,8 1.3 - 1.3 -0.06 37 .o - 3.1 - 3. 7 -14.9 12 14.3 50,0 
Orkney 2~. 7 33,9 20.3 10.1 3.41 660.6 i5.9 14.9 3.0 69 ll. 3 -31.0 
Shetland 8.9 42.1 66.4 72.4 7,96 849,9 62.5 69,0 6. 8 79 5. J 75;6 
WcstP.rn Isles - 1. 6 3,1 8, 2 8.1 1.26 564.7 16.4 3,5 - 5.8 119 33.7 98.3 
~: COSLA, Statistics on Local Authoritl E~enditure 1 mimeo, 1981. 
behind Shetland (72.4%) and Orkney (40.4%). Dumbarton (27.4%) finds 
itself on the 1 hit list' even though it is only thirteenth in the 
district 'league'. West Lothian (39.2%), Banff and Buchan (38.2%), 
Lochaber (35.3%), Moray (35.1%), Aberdeen (33.3%), Caithness (33.1%) 
and ~Jnfermline (30.5%) have been left off this first list, despite 
higher excesses over guidelines. All 7 warned councils are Labour-
controlled. Of the 2 islands and 7 districts listed above which have
not been included in the first list only 3 are Labour-controlled. 
The Secretary of State has stressed that performance against 
guidelines for 1981-2 is not the sole criterion. Therefore, the ev-
idence produced by criteria (b) to (e) ought to be the basis of the 
apparent anomalies 
above. However, no indication has been provided 
these criteria. Furthermore, the 
as to the relative importance of 
second column 
criteria themselves are problematic. For exaillple, the 
of Criterion C shows the change in volume expenditure over the per-
iod 1978-79 to 1981-82 required by the Scottish Office guidelines. 
It reveals wide disparities between authorities, particularly for 
districts. Whereas the average reduction for districts over the 
three year period was 4.9%, the individual changes ranged from 
-32.5% (Caithness) to +40.5% (Argyll and Bute). Performance against 
guidelines depends upon how these change as well as how spending 
changes! 
There is also an important difference between expressing a 
criterion in terms of levels (e.g. rate poundages) and of changes 
(e.g. increases in rate poundages). This emerges very clearly in 
the cases of Dundee ~,d Stirling. It can be seen from their entries
under Criterion D that the~r levels, although high, are not except-
ional: however, recent changes have been dramatic (150% and 122% 
in 1981-82). The period chosen by the Secretary of State is also 
significant: a considerable bias is introduced by taking 1978-79 
as the base year. If the comparison was taken back to 1975-76 (the 
first year of the new authorities), ~Jndee and Stirling would fare 
minority Conservative admin-
much better. Both these councils had 
of modest pound-
istrations from 1977 to 1980 : these were periods 
age increases or reductions. If both councils had remained Labour-
controlled throughout, and steadily increased poundages, it is 
much less likely that either would now be penalised. 
The use of rate poundages as a criterion is dubious 
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other reasons. Midwinter and Page(
23
) have suggested explanations 
other than just expenditure growth for increased poundages and var-
iations between authorities: the use of balances; changes in the 
level and structure of grant; and the inflation alloWill<Ce implicit 
in cash limits being lower than the actual rate. For any given ex-
penditure per capita chosen by a local authority, the Government 
effectively determines the poundage it must levy. In no sense can it 
be viewed as an independent criterion. Furthermore, a major factor 
explaining variations in poundages is the different policies adopt-
ed with regard to rate fund contributions to housing revenue acc-
ounts. Local authorities which have breached the Government's guide-
lines on rate fund contributions have been penalised by pound for 
pound reductions in their capital allocations. Such use of rate 
poundages unadjusted to remove the effects of rate fund contribu-
tions to housing revenue accounts means a double penalty is being 
exacted. 
The most remarkable feature, however, is the Secretary of 
State's choice of comparator authorities. He has compared expendi-
ture per capita (see Criterion Bon Table 10) for each of the 7 
councils against the average for a group of authorities who are re-
garded as being as closely comparable as practicable in terms of 
demo9raphic factors such as the settlement pattern of the popula-
tion and the number of rateable subjects( 24 ). This choice of com-
parators is judgemental and not based on any statistical criteria. 
Whereas the link between expenditure need and demographic charac-
teristics is clear, the relevance of the number of rateable subjects 
to either e~)enditure need or rate poundage is not. 
Quite apart from the methodological criticisms of the manner 
in which they were chosen, the comparators are wholly unconvincing. 
Table 11 uses the evidence from two governmental studies as a 
basis for evaluating the Secretary of State's choice of comparators. 
These two independent studies, which seek to classify local authori-
ties, were undertaken by Webber and Craig for the Office of Popula-
tion Censuses and Surveys(
25
): and by Burbridge and Robertson in 
an internal study within the Scottish Office's Central Research 
Unit(
26
). Webber and Craig applied the statistical technique of 
cluster analysis to 40 basic indicators for each of the 457 lower-
tier (i.e. district and island) authorities in Great Britain pro-
45 
lr 
ducin9 30 clusters and, by :further aggregation, 6 ':families'. Bur-
bridge and Robertson :first classified Scottish local authorities 
as rural or urban on the basis of agricultural employment and sett-
lement patterns and then applied cluster analysis, but only to the 
rural authorities. 
Table 11 focuses upon the 6 districts threatened with 9rant 
withdrawal : Part A gives the Webber and Craig code :for each of the 
6 (the meaning of the codes is explained in Ta~le 12); Part B 
lists all the Scottish authorities which appear in the s~ne cluster 
as the •warned' authorities (if the Secretary of State chose one of 
these as a comparator, it is underlined); 
and Part C lists the 
other comparators cited by the Secretary of State and gives their 
code. An asterisk against an authority means that the Central Re-
search Unit study classified it as rural. Because of the different 
approaches, the two studies classify some authorities rather diff-
erently. 
The Secretary of State's judgemental comparators can be given 
scores against the Webber and Craig study. For Cumnock and Doon 
Valley, he chose 3 of his 5 co~parators :from the 15 in the same 
:for Renfrew, 2 of 
cluster; :for Dumbarton, 4 of his 5 :fro~ 15; 
his 5 :from 15; :for Dundee, 1 of his 5 :from 7; 
:for East Lothian, 
1 of his 5 :from 7; and, :for Stirling, 1 of his 4 from 7. The 
choice of the expanding new town of East Kilbride as a comparator 
for the declining industrial city of Dundee is remarkable. Stir-
ling's comparators are all rural authorities whereas both indepen-
dent studies classify it as urban. Less can be said about Lothian's
comparators because the :focus of both studies is upon the district 
and island tier. Nevertheless, Grampian and Tayside, both with 




~1ilst the difficulties of producing defensible co~parators 
are undeniable, the Scottish Office's exercise is unconvincing. 
Judgemental techniques are always open to the allegation that the 
criteria and co~parators are chosen in ·~cder to 'select' predeter-
mined authorities. Nothing has been done to allay such suspicions -
indeed there has been much to arouse them. For instance, there was 
a considerable delay before the Scottish Office could provide COSLA 
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TABLE 12 THE WEBBER AND CRAIG FAMILIES AND CLUSTERS 
Family and Cluster 
Number of 
Autborities 
Family 1 Suburban and growth areas 
High status areas with manufacturing employment 20 
Rural growth areas 31 
~!2~~-~~~!~~-----------·-------------------------~~--
16<4 Older high status residential areas 28 
'n a A~o~~ with farEe StUdent populationS 6 ~ 
Family 2 Rural and resort areas 
2A/7 Rural Wales and Scottish Island areas 16 
2A/S Rural West 32 
2A/9 Rural East 31 
2A/l0: Rural Scotland 23 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
28/ll: Resort retirement-centres 19 








Traditional industry and mining areas 
Lowland heavy industrial areas 
Upland heavy industrial areas 
The Black Country and similar areas 
Areas with large industrial plants 








Family 4 : Service centres 
4A/l9: ~etropolitan service centres 12 
-~~L~~~-!~~-~!~!-~~~-~!-~~~~~~-------------------------------------~-----
48 21: 9 
4 service centres 19 
erseyside regional centres 6 
Family 5 Areas with much local authority housing 
5A/24 Scottish industrial areas 
5A725 Oversp1ll areas 






Family 6 : Inner and Central London 
6A/2B: Kensington and Chelsea l 
----~~L~~~-~~~~E~!-~~~~~~---------------------------------------------~ 7 




The dotted lines sub-dividing families 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 together vith the vhole of 
family J, give the eleven family classificat.ions. The code 4B/2l means that 
an authority is in the second part of family 4 and in cluster 21. Underlining 
indicates that a Scottish authority appears in this cluster. 
Webber, R. and Craig, J., Socio-economic classification of local authority areas, 
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Studies in !iedical and ?opulation 
Subjects No.35, London: HMSO, 1978. 
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in the letters of 3rd .June to the 7 warned authorities. COSLA was 
not able to circulate this material to member authorities until 2nd 
July - the day before replies from the 7 were re~1ired. But this 
information should have been readily available as the basis for se-
lecting the 7. The Secretary of State also refused to answer a set 
of parliamentary questions from Donald Dewar seeking both comparab~ 
information for other authorities and to extend the comparisons 
back to 1975-76. Donald Dewar was referred to Rating Review (the 
annual publication of the Scottish Branch of the Chartered Insti-
tute of Public Finance and Accountancy) which is entirely based on 
budgets(
28 l. Such omissions are particularly important because the 
Scottish Office has not published any post-reorganisation local 
goverru~ent financial statistics (i.e. since 1974-75) whereas excell-
ent volumes are available for England and Wales. 
Although the Secretary of State is likely to win the open con-
frontation with Lothian, the conflict will impose substantial pen-
alties upon him. In reality, Lothian simply could not cut its bud-
get by £47m in the remainder of 1981-82 because of ad~inistrative 
obstacles (e.g. redundancy notice periods). The total saving to 
the public sector is likely to be much smaller than the nominal one. 
This, however, raises issues beyond this chapter about the Govern-
ment's overall expenditure strategy. Higher unemployment costs are 
a problem for ru1other minister - though they will in turn exert 
further pressure on other programmes including Scotland. 
The Secretary of State will have to secure most of his £100m 
target for 1981-82 by general reductions. But he is likely to find 
that the many distasteful aspects of this exercise in selective 
grant withdrawal have soured his relationship with other authori-
ties. Some, like Strathclyde Regional Council stood to gain from 
the use of selective penalties against others. However, they will 
view with great alarm the Secretary of State's ability to rewrite 
the rules on a day-to-day basis. 
No explanation has been provided as to why the Secretary of 
State threatened to reduce Lothian's RSG by £53m (84% of its budget-
ed expenditure above guidelines); or to seek approval for an Order 
cutting£47m (89% of the original); or indeed the figure he would 
compromise at. No statement has been made as to how many other auth-
orities will be first warned and then have grant withdrawn. No satis-
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:factory explanation has been given :for why Cumnock and Do.:>n Valley's
o:f:fer o:f cuts worth 22% o:f their expenditure above guidelines sec-
ured an acquittal but East Lothian's 26% merely a stay o:f execution.
No 1 tari:f:f 1 has been published settin9 out the penalties :for talk-
ing too loudly as well as spending too much: 
Stirling's defiant reply presumably cost them money! Nobody knows 
the rules any longer. 
V Conclusion 
As events are still unfolding as this chapter is completed, 
it is not possible to draw any :final conclusions. For ex&nple, we 
do not know whether the withdrawal o:f grant :from penalised 
ties will result in compliance or chaos. What we can do at this 
ture (writin9 just a:fter the House .:>:f Commons has approved the 
ders against Lothian Region and Dundee and Stirling Districts) is 
to o:f:fer an interpretation o:f recent developuents. 
The most significant consequence of the Government's attempts 
to impose its public expenditure policy upon Scottish local authori-
ties has been to impose great strains upon the informal networks 
and arran9ements through which central-local relations in Scotla:1d 
have customarily been conducted. Commentators have o:ften argued 
that Scottish local authorities are generally more compliant to 
wishes o:f the Scottish O:f:fice than their English counterparts are 
to those o:f Whitehall ministries. I:f this is true, it is not just 
because Scottish local authorities are dependent :for a higher pro-
portion o:f their income on central gover~ment grants. The Scottish 
O:f:fice is much more able to respo:1d 'corporately' because it is a 
single ministry covering almost all local government activities. 
~1ilst Scottish local authorities are thus deprived o:f the oppor-
tunity to play 'divide and rule', they gain the chance o:f influenc-
ing the development o:f the Scottish O:f:fice's own thinkin9. 
The pattern o:f central-local relations has been sustained by 
the existence o:f mutual interests. Wnatever party di:f:ferences might 
exist, both the Secretary o:f State and the local authorities shared 
the commitment to advance or protect Scottish interests. As a 
territorial department capable o:f t~<ing some kind o:f corporate 
view, the Scottish O:f:fice was well-equipped :for this task. The 
Secretary o:f State knew that this would be the acid test o:f his in-
cumbency in Scottish eyes. Local authorities would much rather Jeal 
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with a Minister with whom they shared such perceptions than with the 
Treasury itself. This in turn implied an obligation not to carry 
opp.:>sition to his policies so :far that this threatened to undermine 
his position in Cabinet. We can thus detect elements o:f the sense 
o:f community (i.e. shared values and perceptio!1s) which Heclo and 
k (29) d . . . . . Wildavs y argue was so J.mportant J.n sustaJ.nJ.ng the publJ.c ex-
pendi t·.ue planning process within Whitehall. 
All the rules - always unwritten and sometimes only dimly per-
ceived - have in the last year suddenly been thrown into question by 
the conflicts which have occurred. There are many :facets to the 
crisis. A few controlling Labour Groups undoubtedly view the conflict 
over local goverru~ent expenditure as the :fro!1t line o:f the battle 
against the Conservative Government: in their eyes Mr Younger's 
IDniability and competence cannot mask the :fact that he is 'Mrs 
Thatcher's man in Scotland'. Well-publicised defiance thus becomes 
an objective in itself. Alon9side the appeals to 'local democracy' 
and the 'local mandate' is the challenge, usually implicit but some-
times explicit, to the Conservative Government's right to govern 
Scotla:1d 9iven the composition o:f Scottish MPs. 
But it would be entirely wrong to portray the conflict as simp-
ly between the Secretary o:f State and a :few radicalised Labour coun-
cils. Throughout local government, members and o:f:ficials are alarmed 
by the implications o:f recent developments. The widespread irrita-
tion with the brinkmanship o:f Lothian is based upo!1 :fears that the 
instruments which the Secretary of State devises :for Lothian today 
will be a;:>plied to everybody tomorrow. The recent Scottish Act is 
widely regarded as a direct response to the actions o:f Lothian(
3
0)_ 
As a sanction against its revenue budget, Lothian's capital alloca-
tion was suspended in 1980-81. Subsequently 27 councils lost part o:f 
their housing capital allocations in 1981-82 because of rate :fu"ld 
contributions above guidelines. Once the Secretary of State had de-
vised a method o:f punishing a council :for taking a perfectly legal 
decision, he then extended it to another context and many councils. 
The way in which selective grant withdrawal has been applied to 
Lothian, Dundee and Stirling means that very :few councils can :feel 
much security that they will not be subsequent targets. 
Despite his initial reluctance to :follow Mr Heseltine into 
head--on conflict with local authorities, the Secretary o:f State has 
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allowed himselr to be drawn into an extremely centralist position. 
The importance or ratepayers as part or the Conservative political 
coalition has overcome the Party's traditional sentiments against 
centralisation. Consequently, the Secretary or State rorsook the 
option or waiting ror the rebel councils to be disciplined by the 
electorate despite the £act that Lothian, Dundee and Stirling are 
all marginal councils. Furthermore, the regional elections are due 
in May 1982. There is some evidence rrom recent local elections in 
London that, despite the crucial importance or national swings, 
size or rates increases can result in substantial local deviat 
A strategy or relying upon an electoral backlash would have allowed 
the Secretary or State to avoid both the practical dirriculties and 
the centralist dangers or selective action. 
The rejection or this course or action suggests that the Sec-
retary or State has himselr become caught up in the rhetoric or the 
political drama. King has demonstrated just how small are the mac-
roeconomic errects or marginal local authority expenditure rinanced 
by additional rates( 32 l. Moreover, as the Government's policy ro-
cus is upon rinancial variables such as the money supply (M3) and 
the PSBR rather than upon aggregate real expenditure, the notion 
that a rew deriant local authorities can wreck the Government's 
economic strategy is rar-retched. Nevertheless the need to derend 
the integrity or its economic strategy has been consistently advan-
ced as the justirication ror insisting that local government expen-
diture must be reduced to the White Paper levels. 
The tensions between the Secretary or State and local authori-
ties have been exacerbated by the way in which he and his ministers 
have been willing to appeal to the widely believed myth that local 
government expenditure has been growing rapidly and is out or con-
trol·. Although evocative, the 'runaway train' metaphor is entirely 
without substance. Allegations or prorligacy and extravagance have 
caused both annoyance and pain in local government circles. Even 
so, there was a much more muted response to the Scottish Bill than 
to the earlier English Bill. COSLA did not mount a sustained public
campaign against it comparable to the English local authority 
iations' strident (ir eventually unsuccessrul) one. The quiet par-
liamentary passage would have been more appropriate ror a minor 
technical piece or legislation than ror one involving important 
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principles: it was enlivened only by the duel between Mr Malcolm 
Riikind, the Scottish Environment Minister, and Mr Donald Dewar, his 
Opposition shadow. The attempt by COSLA to widen the debate about 
expenditure cuts through the publication in May 1981 or The COSLA 
critique vividly highlighted the dirriculties it races in mobilising 
local government against Government policy: the 2 Conservative 
members or the 5 member sub-committee disowned the report at the 
launching press conrerence. The dispute about the Government's grants 
policy only reached the top or the political agenda in June 1981 
when the Secretary or State named the 7 councils rrom which he in-
tended to withdraw grant. 
The present conrlict, whatever its i~~ediate resolution, seems 
likely to have a lasting inrluence upon the shape or central-local 
relations in Scotland. The instruments which the Government has 
shown itselr prepared to use imply a subservient role ror local 
authorities: the power or selective grant withdrawal errectively 
nulliries their statutory right to set rate poundages at the levels 
they believe appropriate; and the use or capital allocations as an 
alternative sanction against revenue decisions removes another im-
portant area or local discretion. Such tightening or the rinancial 
constraints within which local authorities must operate has been 
accompanied by the impact or other Government policy measures. Sev-
eral policies which are intended by the Government to enhance the 
rreedom or the individual at the expense or the state (e.g. tenants' 
rights to buy council houses and the parents' charter) have been 
to the detriment or local authorities rather than or central gov-
ernment. Whatever the intrinsic merits or otherwise or these mea-
sures, a discussion or which ralls outside this chapter, it is un-
deniable that they have centralised power within the public sector. 
Given the low status attached to local government within 
British political culture, it is dirricult to predict anything 
other than more central control. A rebirth or local autonomy seems 
highly implausible. The response or a ruture Labour Government is 
unpredictable as it is unclear what lessons will be drawn rrom the 
present conrlict. Bruce Millan has made an explicit commitment that 
the 1981 Act would be repealed but has said nothing about the ear-
lier 1966 Act powers(
33 l. In orrice, Labour might be torn between 
its rekindled enthusiasm ror local democracy and the temptation to 
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~se these powers against local authorities with low standards of 
services. There seems to be little chance of fundamental reform em-
erging from the present Government's promised Green Paper on local 
government finance. Given recent events, it is unlikely to co~fer 
new revenue sources upon local authorities: it would be ironic 
indeed if a Conservative Government, after defending Lothian rate-
payers from their regional council, were to introduce a local in-
come tax. Much more likely is a continued period of drifting with-
out any coherent sense of direction but which results in practice 
in tighter central control. One particular da.'l9er for local authori-
ties would be renewed manifesto commitments to abolish rates, the 
sole local tax, without any replacement bei"lg specified. The out-
look for local authorities seems bleak: the erosion of their ex-
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